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Abstract
The increase in IoT sensing and actuating devices that are
seamlessly integrated into the environment is often leading to a
mistrust of users as it becomes impossible to spot deployed IoT
devices and understand their purposes and capabilities. One
approach is to provide an appropriate mechanism of mapping
the IoT and address stakeholder requirements. However, pro-
viding comprehensive maps of the IoT may expose a number
of vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. We conducted a
comprehensive literature survey outlining the limitations of the
existing body of work regarding the mapping of the IoT and
conducting an appropriate threat analysis. We subsequently
applied the STRIDE model to two case studies (smart campus
and urban environment) to identify a set of potential vulnera-




The Internet of Things (IoT) is growing rapidly with an es-
timated 23 billion connected devices deployed worldwide in
2018 [20]. These devices range from expensive infrastructure
components, such as actuators in smart cities, through to low-
cost commodity devices such as radio frequency beacons (e.g.
iBeacons). While the number of devices, and the degree of
connectivity is growing, researchers have noted that we are in-
creasingly unaware of the locations and purposes of such de-
vices with consequences for the types of applications that can
be supported and for user trust in the IoT [19, 17].
In order to address these issues, researchers have begun to con-
sider the notion of “mapping the IoT” by developing mech-
anisms, to create comprehensive catalogues of IoT devices
deployed in an environments such as smart buildings and, at
larger scales, urban environments. While there are clear ad-
vantages for the creation of maps of the IoT, we believe the
security implications of the creation, storage, and distribution
of IoT maps, and the subsequent use of these maps by client
devices or critical infrastructure have not been considered pre-
viously. In this paper, we make three contributions:
1. We present the results of a systematic literature review
designed to help quantify the limitations in the scientific
community’s understanding of the cybersecurity implica-
tions of mapping the IoT.
2. We conduct a comprehensive threat analysis categoris-
ing vulnerabilities according to the “three pillars” model
of cybersecurity [15] where a vulnerability represents an
identified weakness of a ‘resource’ (i.e. technology, peo-
ple and processes) involved in the activity of supporting
and maintaining maps of the IoT.
3. We illustrate potential threats using two example use
cases of IoT deployments.
We not seek to discourage the production of IoT maps, rather
we hope to help researchers understand the potential threats
and vulnerabilities associated with mapping IoT based systems
and highlight the need for further research in this area.
2 Related work
2.1 Digital maps
It has been claimed we are currently in the midst of an era of
web mapping termed by some as the GeoWeb or Web map-
ping 2.0 [11] and it’s hard to dispute these systems and ser-
vices have become ubiquitous in our modern lives. Web map
providers like Google Maps, TomTom and OpenStreetMaps
have enabled a wide variety of services and applications (in-
cluding satellite, street level image snapshots and indoor floor
plans; transport planning and routing services; and turn-by-
turn navigation for mobile device versions of the maps). Many
of the common mapping services are for human use, although
we have seen a recent rise in the use of maps by machines
(more specifically autonomous robots) for navigation [3].
2.2 Mapping the IoT
Recent years have seen a drastic increase in research and com-
mercial interest in the Internet of Things, with many ventures
producing management platforms, frameworks, and novel sys-
tems for the IoT.
The breadth of IoT devices that exist today with varied capabil-
ities and details has made it difficult to reach a widely adopted
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standard for representing and interacting with the various de-
vices and services. While one solution might be for some stan-
dard to emerge for devices themselves, others have opted to
instead create frameworks and systems to support the catalogu-
ing and interactions for IoT devices with the goal of maximis-
ing interoperability between heterogeneous IoT devices and
services [23, 2, 9, 12, 14]. Work done in [6] has also explored
localised and directional queries of geo-tagged sensor data-sets
in the hopes to not overwhelm users with potentially cluttered
maps.
Some previous attempts have also been made at creating open
data sets of IoT devices deployed around the world [18, 5] and
although these particular examples appear to have stopped re-
ceiving regular updates or upkeep, it does show a growing de-
sire to generate repositories and geo-spatial maps of IoT de-
vices.
2.3 Security risks from location traces
Despite efforts at anonymising location traces (e.g. by using
anonymous identifiers), access to historic anonymised location
traces can yet reveal comprehensive insights into individuals
and their identities [16]. Even the application of more sophis-
ticated approaches to protect user privacy, e.g. by adding noise
using face location information, cannot provide sufficient se-
curity – and insights into activities and individuals can still
be revealed [4]. Gassen and Fhom [10] describe the risks of
“Mobile Location Analytics” that emerge from using location
tracking (and additional sensors) in commercial contexts such
as retail and airports and specifically raise concerns regard-
ing the sensitive nature of data captured, processed and stored
about analytics. The authors suggest that location tracking is
always transparently and clearly communicated to individuals
to improve privacy.
3 Evidencing a Lack of Prior Research
3.1 Methodology
To gain insights into the extent of prior research in the field we
conducted a systematic literature review – adopting a similar
methodology to that employed in [21] for the highways main-
tenance domain.
Data Sources
We recognise that security concerns specifically relating to
maps of the IoT is a relatively niche area of research at the
time of writing, but does sit within established areas of com-
puter science. We selected three of the most well known digital
libraries in the space to try cover the majority of existing ma-
terial (ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, Scopus).
Keywords
Our search queries were generated from three keyword cate-
gories: Mapping, IoT, and Security. The keywords for map-
Fig. 1: Search categories and synonyms
ping were manually selected from common words. For the IoT
and Security category, we used a subset of the keywords used
by a prior literature review in IoT security [21]. The keywords
are generally made up of synonyms and abbreviations of the
category name, with a total count of 28 words that created 720
unique queries containing one word from each category.
Automated retrieval
The number of keyword combinations required an automated
approach to complete in a realistic time frame. A Python
script was used to created and execute each query on each data
source. This resulted in a total of 2, 399 requests across all
digital libraries. Articles that contained the keywords in their
abstract had their meta data saved into a spreadsheet. Details
included: name of source, DOI, author list, title, abstract, pub-
lication name, and keywords.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Articles chosen for inclusion in the review from our three
data sources and were required to be written in English, peer-
reviewed, and contain a combination of keywords from our
three categories. Duplicates were removed, along with any ar-
ticles only weakly related. Instances where a keyword was
used for a different meaning/context were also excluded. For
example, keywords related to ‘mapping’ saw frequent use as a
generic term for associating differing groups or sets of items,
rather than the definition we were seeking (creation of maps).
‘Survey’ also saw more use as its more common definition for
examining something, instead of the more geographic context
in which the term can be used.
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Review Process
A large set of papers were returned from the automated script
and it was not feasible to review all papers. Instead we con-
ducted an initial filtering phase for relevance based on the ti-
tles of each paper. Selections from this stage were then read
and reviewed for their discussion of security concerns when
dealing with maps or the IoT. Any papers that did not fit this
criteria were also considered for inclusion as related works and
any papers not relevant were ignored.
3.2 Results
The automated search for combinations of our three keyword
categories returned 2, 399 articles (IEEE-660, Scopus-1643,
ACM-96). After manual review of paper titles, removal of
duplicates, and incorrect result types (e.g. entire conference
proceedings), 31 papers were selected for full review.
The initial filtering process removed a large number of papers
that were related to IoT systems and security (e.g [24], but
very few included mapping as a core topic of the paper, and
even fewer then addressed security concerns of geo-spatially
mapping their IoT deployments. Those selected for full review
were perceived to potentially include all these areas. However,
only one paper was found to address vulnerabilities of a mod-
ern travel/navigation service [22] in which the authors explored
security vulnerabilities of the Waze app. They were able to
spoof vehicles to manipulate congestion predictions and affect
routing and were also able to track individual users through
unique identifiers used by Waze. IoT maps that rely on crowd-
sourced reporting and location based data and decision making
are vulnerable to the same exploits if not handled correctly.
e.g. fake users reporting, manipulating crowd validation to try
hide/remove devices from the map, non-existent devices spoof-
ing sensor data to manipulate systems.
Our literature survey presented in section 2 identified a set of
attempts at mapping the IoT, e.g. by providing spatial maps of
IoT sensors deployed in urban environments [5], repositories
of data captured through a subset of IoT sensors deployed [6]
and providing security and interoperability standards such as
HyperCat [13]. We identified a set of techniques for the cre-
ation and maintenance of mapping the IoT. However, these
existing mapping services are primarily targeted at supporting
the administration and management of IoT devices, at a simi-
lar level as inventory and deployment management platforms.
For example, Microsoft Azure provides a mapping service that
administrators can use to maintain a database of IoT devices,
their spatial locations, captured data and supported interfaces.
However, the result of our systematic literature review high-
lighted that while much research is being conducted to secure
IoT data and location privacy, some using geo-spatial maps as
use cases, there is an almost total lack of research into the se-
curity risks once malicious 3rd parties could gain access to or
manipulate the map data.
4 Case Studies
To help scope our analysis of security threats when designing,
generating, and maintaining maps of the IoT we present two
example case studies of IoT deployments. The use cases differ
in context of deployment and the types of devices in use.
4.1 Case Study 1: A Smart Campus Environment
Our first case study is of the deployment of Bluetooth Low En-
ergy (BLE) beacons around the Lancaster University campus.
The beacons are used for two distinct purposes: to support a
pervasive display personalisation research test-bed, and to en-
able automatic student attendance check-ins.
The e-Campus display testbed
The e-Campus display network consists of over 80 displays
and is the world’s largest research test-bed for digital signage,
with displays placed in commonly visited areas around campus
(including student learning zones, department building, col-
lege porters lodges, and outside lecture theatres). The displays
use the Yarely signage player [7] to fetch scheduling details and
content to display – commonly a mixture of news items, event
advertisements and promotional material, with different con-
tent created for combinations of students, staff, and visitors.
Over 50 of the displays are also fitted with iBeacons to enable
personalisation through the use of the mobile app Tacita [8].
When users walk past a display their phone detects proxim-
ity to the display (using the iBeacons) and requests person-
alised content to be shown. To identify the display, the iBea-
cons attached to the display broadcast a unique identifier that
is mapped to a display in the display infrastructure backend.
Attendance monitoring
Students are required to record their attendance to timetabled
sessions of their course and have recently been given the op-
tion to do this via the mobile companion app of the University.
BLE beacons (similar to those on the displays) are deployed
into lecture theatres and seminar rooms. During timetabled
sessions the mobile application reports a user as present if a
beacon is detected in the background, or if the student manu-
ally triggers the scan for beacons. The goal of this service ix
to automate the previously laborious and manual task of atten-
dance capture, reducing the time spent by students and staff.
While the attendance monitoring and digital signage applica-
tions both use BLE beacons they are operated as entirely sepa-
rate systems and beacons are only used for a single purpose.
4.2 Case Study 2: Smart Urban Environment
Our second case study focuses on the deployment of a novel
cyber-physical drainage management system (SmartWater) de-
veloped to support managing transport authorities in undertak-
ing more proactive maintenance planning to mitigate the im-
pact of flooding across the network and reduce cost.
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At present the system, that comprising remote drainage condi-
tion sensing (i.e. silt-level), predictive analytics and data visu-
alisation capabilities is the first of its kind to be deployed in the
UK across four urban environments (including Worcester, Ply-
mouth & Bristol City Centres) with 36 gully probes deployed
in both road-side gullies and rail-side catch pits.
The system provides a step-change in inefficient “corrective”
maintenance practices through a next-generation IoT sensor
probe, empowering maintainers with a deeper understanding
of drainage silt, water and light level conditions. In particular,
these new forms of drainage data address limitations of manual
asset inspection information that is often relied upon to coor-
dinate work but is collected infrequently, highly subjective and
generally perceived as unreliable by maintainers themselves.
Data transmission in-field is supported through a multi-band
wireless communications network that relays condition infor-
mation to a cloud-based data processing platform where on-
line training of new statistical models to predict asset condi-
tions (e.g. future risk of flooding) is performed. The broad
needs of maintainers in strategic, tactical and operational roles
has resulted in a diverse range of end-user decision-support
tools as part of the system that support explicit data exploration
of historic, real-time and future asset conditions, ‘at-a-glance’
map-based overlays of probes deployed in drainage assets and
SMS/Email notifications to draw attention to emerging flood
risks on the network.
While the drainage system described above currently has a lim-
ited number of sensors deployed in the field this is expected to
increase significantly as the technology gains acceptance.
5 Threat Analysis
To address the potential threats of mapping the IoT, we cate-
gorise threats according to the three pillars of cyber-security set
out by the international standard ISO27001 [1]: Technology,
People, Process. These considerations assess the existence of
specific threats for the integrity of the data and, additionally,
issues that can arise if malicious parties get possession of the
map datasets.
5.1 Technology
Data tampering. While not a unique security concern to IoT
maps, data tempering still presents an important set of threats.
Attackers could inject, edit or remove fake data to disrupt a sys-
tem, or provide the attacker with control over a system based
on insights gained through the data encoded. In the context
of the display personalisation system in our first case study
(“a smart campus environment”), the mobile client application
relies on beacon details to detect the user’s proximity to a par-
ticular display. Manipulating beacon identifiers stored as part
of the map would effectively disable the core functionality of
the system. Furthermore, man-in-the-middle attacks could be
executed if certain callback URIs for personaliseable display
applications were manipulated.
Physical tampering. Public spaces are likely to consist of a
large number of IoT devices that are left open to physical tam-
pering such as damaging, re-location or manipulations. Storing
IoT devices in a common map may allow attackers to retrieve
the physical locations of potentially hidden IoT devices that
have been installed in public areas. Similar to data tampering,
physical tampering can lead to the map description of a space
not representing the situation in the real world. Our smart ur-
ban environment use case is particularly sensitive to physical
tampering: incorrect sensor readings or physically damaged
sensors can incur heavy costs and asset loss if not managed
properly.
Access control. IoT maps are likely to contain sensitive infor-
mation, especially in high security areas where access to these
maps also becomes important (e.g. map of a bank vaults CCTV
cameras and other sensors). IoT maps containing auxiliary in-
formation (e.g. beacon details and IP addresses) can further
provide the necessary basis for attackers to use the information
encoded to fake, spoof and exploit system functionality. In the
context of the attendance monitoring system part of the smart
campus environment, fake beacons can be created based on
the beacon identifiers encoded in a map in order to fake and
spoof attendance from any location. Furthermore, knowing
network details can reveal potential targets for DDoS attacks
or entry points for hacking into devices which is of particular
concern in the IoT space where many sensors or devices have
been found to have weak security [25].
Broadcasting. If IoT maps are designed and populated on the
basis that IoT devices broadcast their locations and capabili-
ties, potential attackers are not required to gain access to an
IoT map. Instead, broadcasting features of IoT devices may be
used by malicious parties to create their own maps of the IoT
simply by ‘visiting’ places or accessing network points (de-
pending on the broadcasting technology used).
5.2 People
Accurate data entry. The entry of data into an IoT map will
likely not originate from a single entity but will be relying on
third parties that are required to enter correct data. This is espe-
cially the case in which third parties installing a device are not
necessarily the space owners or map providers. As a result, the
accuracy and integrity of the resulting map may be negatively
impacted.
Data disclosure. A large portion of map data is open to disclo-
sure (either deliberately or accidentally) suggesting a need for
new trust relationships to develop at all stages ranging form
the installation of IoT devices through to giving third parties
access to the data. With the growth of location tracking serves,
accidental disclosure may occur through the lack of knowledge
of use. One example of accidental data disclosure is an exer-
cise application (Strava) that tracked user routes through lo-
cation services and released anonymised location traces. How-
ever, the correlation of (anonymised) location traces from mul-
tiple users allowed attackers to identify secret military instal-
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lations across the world.
5.3 Process
Lack of standards. Standards or attempts at creating standards
for describing IoT devices and their communication interfaces
have previously been published (e.g. HyperCat [13]). Equally,
systems for the description of location information have also
been developed such as GIS. However, such standards are not
specific to the mapping of IoT devices, particularly around sup-
porting a description of device capabilities, additional eta data
and various location description types. The lack of such stan-
dards can lead to a high amount of heterogenous and incompat-
ible maps for the IoT – increasing the burden for maintaining
and using such maps. As a direct consequence, the costs for
maintaining maps of varying standards and developoing inter-
gration mechanisms that allow the use of heterogenous maps
in a common system are likely to increase with the number of
maps deployed. Utilising a comkmon standard for IoT maps
can address these challenges and ensure compatibility.
Responsibility. Previous research has identified a number of
different approaches to creating and populating IoT maps, e.g.
authoritative (space owners or administrators provide details of
devices) and crowd-souring (individuals report locations and
capabilities of devices) [19]. However, currently no process
or definition exists that clearly states which approach may be
appropriate for certain contexts. For example, when is it ap-
propriate or required for space owners or engineers to report
on devices installed and populate a map? Such a lack of pro-
cesses defining responsibilities may lead to confusion and con-
sequently to missing, incomplete or inaccurate maps. In the
context of a smart campus, for example, an incomplete map di-
rectly impacts on the system reliability and availability, leading
to a poor user experience or missing attendance longs.
6 Closing remarks
The vision of the IoT is becoming a reality with a wide range
of sensors and actuators being deployed and used in a multi-
tude of different settings. We now rely on the IoT to deliver
safe, secure critical infrastructure such as transport, power and
communications networks while IoT devices are also widely
used in domestic and entertainment settings. The increasing
proliferation of devices in the wild has led researchers to call
for the development of IoT maps that show the location and
purpose of IoT devices – primarily to help ease concerns re-
garding privacy and trust [19].
However, our research suggests that little attention has been
paid to the potential cybersecurity risks that such maps might
incur. In this paper we have provided evidence of the lack of
research focus in this area and provided examples of poten-
tial threats based on two case studies – a smart campus and a
component of an IoT enabled transport infrastructure.
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